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ORIGINALISM  AND  STARE  DECISIS
Amy Coney Barrett*
INTRODUCTION
Justice Scalia was the public face of modern originalism.  Originalism
maintains both that constitutional text means what it did at the time it was
ratified and that this original public meaning is authoritative.  This theory
stands in contrast to those that treat the Constitution’s meaning as suscepti-
ble to evolution over time.  For an originalist, the meaning of the text is fixed
so long as it is discoverable.
The claim that the original public meaning of constitutional text consti-
tutes law is in some tension with the doctrine of stare decisis.  Stare decisis is
a sensible rule because, among other things, it protects the reliance interests
of those who have structured their affairs in accordance with the Court’s
existing cases.  But what happens when precedent conflicts with the original
meaning of the text?  If Justice Scalia is correct that the original public mean-
ing is authoritative, why is the Court justified in departing from it in the
name of a judicial policy like stare decisis?  The logic of originalism might
lead to some unpalatable results.  For example, if the original meaning of the
Constitution’s Gold Clauses prohibits the use of paper money, is an original-
ist bound to plunge the economy into ruin?  Some constitutional theorists
treat precedent as capable of supplementing and even supplanting the text’s
historical meaning; for them, choosing to follow precedent that diverges
from the original meaning is relatively unproblematic.  Originalists, in con-
trast, have difficulty identifying a principled justification for following such
precedent, even when the consequences of overruling it would be extraordi-
narily disruptive.
Faced with this problem, Justice Scalia famously described himself as a
“faint-hearted originalist” who would abandon the historical meaning when
following it was intolerable.1  He claimed that “stare decisis is not part of my
© 2017 Amy Coney Barrett.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes,
so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
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1 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989) (“I
hasten to confess that in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist.”).  Justice Scalia
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originalist philosophy; it is a pragmatic exception to it.”2  That concession left
him vulnerable to criticism from both his intellectual opponents and his
allies.  His opponents argued that Justice Scalia’s willingness to make a prag-
matic exception revealed that originalism is unprincipled in theory and
unworkable in practice.  Some of his allies contended that a principled
originalist should not be afraid to depart from even well-settled precedent.
The tension between stare decisis and originalism gave stare decisis a
newly significant role in debates about constitutional theory.  To be sure,
judges and scholars had long grappled with the pragmatic considerations
that inform the choice between keeping law settled and getting it right.  But
for an originalist, the decision whether to follow erroneous precedent can be
more than a matter of weighing the costs and benefits of change.  At least in
cases involving the interpretation of constitutional text, originalists arguably
face a choice between following and departing from the law embodied in
that text.  While the debate about stare decisis is old, modern originalism
introduced a new issue: the possibility that following precedent might some-
times be unlawful.
This issue was unexplored before Justice Scalia helped propel original-
ism to prominence.  Since then, the question whether stare decisis is compat-
ible with originalism has occupied both originalists and their critics.  In this
Essay, I explore what light Justice Scalia’s approach to precedent casts on that
question.  I argue that while he did treat stare decisis as a pragmatic excep-
tion to originalism, that exception was not nearly so gaping as his “faint-
hearted” quip suggests.  In fact, a survey of his opinions regarding precedent
suggests new lines of inquiry for originalists grappling with the role of stare
decisis in constitutional adjudication.
I. THE PROBLEM OF PRECEDENT
Before addressing the tension between originalism and stare decisis, it is
important to emphasize that precedent itself is not only consistent with, but
critical to, originalism.  Most discussions of originalism’s relationship to pre-
cedent focus on prior Supreme Court opinions.  Yet one cannot paint a com-
plete picture of Justice Scalia’s attitude toward precedent without addressing
his treatment of nonjudicial precedent.  In an important sense, originalism
can be understood as a quintessentially precedent-based theory, albeit one
that does not look primarily to judicial decisions as its guide.
recanted this statement insofar as it indicated his willingness to hold laws unconstitutional
simply because they were unpalatable. See MARCIA COYLE, THE ROBERTS COURT: THE STRUG-
GLE FOR THE CONSTITUTION 165 (2013) (reporting a 2011 interview in which Justice Scalia
“recanted” being a “faint-hearted” originalist and asserted that, contrary to his 1989 state-
ment, he would uphold a state law imposing a punishment like “notching of ears” because
“it’s a stupid idea but it’s not unconstitutional”).  He never recanted it, however, insofar as
it reflected his pragmatic approach to stare decisis.
2 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 140
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
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Originalists maintain that the decisions of prior generations, cast in rati-
fied text, are controlling until lawfully changed.  The contours of those deci-
sions are typically discerned by historical sources.  For example, the meaning
of the original Constitution may be gleaned from sources like the Constitu-
tional Convention, the ratification debates, the Federalist and Anti-Federalist
Papers, actions of the early Congresses and Presidents, and early opinions of
the federal courts.  Originalism thus places a premium on precedent, and to
the extent that originalists reject the possibility of deviating from historically-
settled meaning, one could say that their view of precedent is particularly
strong, not weak as their critics often contend.
Moreover, Justice Scalia framed some of his most vociferous disagree-
ments with Supreme Court precedent as a defense of a competing form of
precedent: the history and traditions of the American people.  For example,
he characterized the standards of scrutiny as “essential” to determining
whether laws violated the Equal Protection Clause but insisted that these
standards “cannot supersede—and indeed ought to be crafted so as to reflect—
those constant and unbroken national traditions that embody the people’s
understanding of ambiguous constitutional texts.”3  When it came to the
Free Speech Clause, the Justice said that he would “take my guidance as to
what the Constitution forbids, with regard to a text as indeterminate as the
First Amendment’s preservation of ‘the freedom of speech,’ and where the
core offense of suppressing particular political ideas is not at issue, from the
long accepted practices of the American people.”4  Dissenting from the
Court’s holding that the Establishment Clause prohibits prayer at commence-
ment ceremonies, Justice Scalia argued that “the Court . . . lays waste a tradi-
tion that is as old as public school graduation ceremonies themselves, and
that is a component of an even more longstanding American tradition of
nonsectarian prayer to God at public celebrations generally.”5  And while Jus-
tice Scalia would not have interpreted the Due Process Clause to have a sub-
stantive component, he did not insist upon cleaning the slate altogether.
Instead, he argued that any substantive content should be determined by
history and tradition rather than by modern attitudes.6  It was what many
conceived of as wrong-headed and excessive devotion to this form of prece-
dent—a devotion that made change difficult—that marked the fault line
between Justice Scalia and those who take an evolutionary approach to con-
stitutional interpretation.
3 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id.
at 568–69 (arguing that when a practice is not contradicted by constitutional text and is
supported by “a long tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged use that dates back
to the beginning of the Republic, we have no proper basis for striking it down” (quoting
Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 95 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
4 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 517 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
5 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631–32 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
6 See infra notes 63–69 and accompanying text.
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Thus originalism does not breed contempt for precedent—quite the
opposite.  That said, originalism prioritizes what we might think of as the
original precedent: the contemporaneously expressed understanding of rati-
fied text.  When new interpretations deviate from the old, and those devia-
tions become entrenched, this comparatively new precedent and a
commitment to the old can be in real tension.7
Originalism rests on two basic claims.8  First, the meaning of constitu-
tional text is fixed at the time of its ratification.9  Second, the original mean-
ing of the text controls because “it and it alone is law.”10  Nonoriginalists
consider the text’s historical meaning to be a relevant factor in interpreting
the Constitution, but other factors, like value-based judgments, might over-
come it.  Originalists, by contrast, treat the original meaning as a relatively
hard constraint.
Justice Scalia and his contemporaries did not pull originalism from thin
air in the 1980s.  On the contrary, Keith Whittington explains that
[a]s a method of constitutional interpretation in the United States, original-
ism has a long history.  It has been prominently advocated from the very first
debates over constitutional meaning.  At various points in American history,
originalism was not a terribly self-conscious theory of constitutional interpre-
tation, in part because it was largely unchallenged as an important compo-
nent of any viable approach to understanding constitutional meaning.
Originalism, in its modern, self-conscious form, emerged only after tradi-
tional approaches had been challenged and, to some degree, displaced.11
7 When considered from the perspective of the Supreme Court, precedent provoking
this problem is most often judicial.  But deeply entrenched, erroneous nonjudicial prece-
dents can also provoke this problem, particularly for political actors committed to original-
ism. See Amy Coney Barrett & John Copeland Nagle, Congressional Originalism, 19 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1, 24 (2016) (identifying several decisions, including the admission of the state
of West Virginia, that some have characterized as inconsistent with the Constitution’s origi-
nal meaning).
8 See Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375,
378 (2013) (“The two crucial components of originalism are the claims that constitutional
meaning was fixed at the time of the textual adoption and that the discoverable historical
meaning of the constitutional text has legal significance and is authoritative in most cir-
cumstances.”); see also Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism,
103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 944–46 (2009) (similarly describing the two core claims of
originalism).
9 Whittington, supra note 8, at 378.
10 Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws,
104 YALE L.J. 541, 552 (1994) (footnote omitted); see also Steven D. Smith, Reply to Koppel-
man: Originalism and the (Merely) Human Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 189, 193 (2010)
(“[O]riginalism insists . . . that what counts as law—as valid, enforceable law—is what
human beings enact, and that the meaning of that law is what those human beings under-
stood it to be.” (footnote omitted)). But see JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT,
ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION (2013) (arguing that the original public mean-
ing should control not because it is “the law” but because following it yields the best
consequences).
11 Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599 (2004)
(footnote omitted).
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Justice Scalia was at the forefront of the movement that developed original-
ism in its “modern, self-conscious form” by defending it as the only democrat-
ically legitimate way to interpret and apply the Constitution.
As originalism rose to prominence, its relationship to precedent became
an issue.12  Stare decisis had received scholarly attention throughout the
twentieth century.  But before originalism recalled attention to the claim that
the original meaning of the text constitutes binding law, no one worried
much about whether adherence to precedent could ever be unlawful—as it
might be if the text’s original meaning constitutes the law and relevant prece-
dent deviates from it.  To be sure, many had contended that stare decisis
ought to be relatively weak in constitutional cases, both out of respect for the
Constitution and because of the difficulty of correcting mistakes by constitu-
tional amendment.13  Justice Douglas, for example, famously asserted that “it
is the Constitution which [a Justice] swore to support and defend, not the
gloss which his predecessors may have put on it.”14  He did not suggest, how-
ever, either that the Court lacked the authority to sometimes adhere to its
predecessors’ erroneous gloss or that it was problematic for the Court to fol-
low precedent that conflicted with the original meaning of the text.  The
latter would have been inconsistent with Justice Douglas’s insistence that “[i]t
is better that we make our own history than be governed by the dead.  We too
must be dynamic components of history if our institutions are to be vital,
directive forces in the life of our age.”15  For a living constitutionalist, the
point of overruling precedent is to bring the meaning of constitutional law
into line with what the Court views as the demands of modernity.  It does not
involve (and indeed vehemently rejects) a return to the past in ways that
could potentially disrupt modernity.
Originalists, in contrast, must grapple with this risk.  Although there is
dispute about which well-settled precedents depart from the original under-
standing, many claim that originalism cannot account for important prece-
dents, including the New Deal expansion of federal power, the administrative
state, and Brown v. Board of Education.16  Henry Monaghan states the problem
12 Justice Scalia fielded questions about the relationship between originalism and stare
decisis during his confirmation hearing before the Senate. See infra notes 32–34 and
accompanying text.  The issue figured even more prominently in the confirmation hear-
ings on the nomination of Robert Bork. THE BORK HEARINGS: HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE MOST
CONTROVERSIAL JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION BATTLE IN U.S. HISTORY 54–66 (Ralph E. Shaffer
ed., 2005).
13 See, e.g., Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406–07 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) (“[I]n cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through
legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier deci-
sions.” (footnote omitted)).
14 William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736 (1949).
15 Id. at 739; see also id. at 749 (suggesting that a willingness to overrule precedent is a
necessary means of updating the law to keep it in line with our living Constitution).
16 See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 668–69 (2009) (“A com-
mitted historicist could easily conclude that the Court’s privacy and women’s rights deci-
sions are wrong, and that the use of paper money as legal tender, the use of the federal
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starkly: the claim that originalism is the “only legitimate standard for judicial
decisionmaking entails a massive repudiation of the present constitutional
order.”17  No serious person would propose to repudiate the constitutional
order, yet some suggest that the logic of originalism requires it.  As Michael
Gerhardt puts it, “Originalists . . . have difficulty in developing a coherent,
consistently applied theory of adjudication that allows them to adhere to
originalism without producing instability, chaos, and havoc in constitutional
law.”18  Consequently, as originalists John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport
admit, “Precedent is often seen as an embarrassment for originalists.”19
Some originalists have tried to reconcile the tension between originalism
and stare decisis.  For example, Michael McConnell, Michael Paulsen, Steven
Calabresi, and Julia Rickert have each tried to blunt the force of the stare
decisis critique by making an originalist case for some arguably nonoriginalist
precedents.20  (While it is an imperfect label, I use the term “nonoriginalist”
as shorthand for precedents that conflict with the original meaning.)  Kurt
Lash has argued that a “popular sovereignty-based originalist” can follow at
least some erroneous precedents without sacrificing her normative commit-
ment to popular sovereignty.21  John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport have
repudiated the proposition that the original public meaning constitutes the
law in favor of the claim that judges and public officials should follow the
original public meaning because doing so yields good consequences.22  Fol-
lowing deeply rooted nonoriginalist precedents is justified, they say, because
when departing from the original public meaning would wreak havoc, follow-
commerce power to establish the welfare state and federal civil rights laws, and the federal
administrative state itself are all unconstitutional.  Yet all of these doctrinal developments
lie beyond any reasonable constitutional objection.” (footnote omitted)).  I do not address
the question whether these cases or any others are in fact inconsistent with the original
public meaning.
17 Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 723, 727 (1988).
18 Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1224 (2006).  This is not
to say, of course, that other constitutional theories do not face similar challenges.  The
concern is especially acute, however, with respect to originalism.
19 MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 10, at 195.
20 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90
TEX. L. REV. 1 (2011) (advancing an originalist argument for the proposition that the
Constitution rules out sex discrimination); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the
Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995) (arguing that Brown v. Board of Education is
consistent with the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment); Michael Stokes Paul-
sen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857,
900–07 (2009) (arguing that Brown, the Legal Tender Cases, and cases validating the admin-
istrative state are each consistent with an originalist understanding of the Constitution).
21 See Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L.
REV. 1437, 1473–77, 1480 n.126 (2007).
22 Id.
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ing precedent yields better consequences than following the original
meaning.23
Other originalists, by contrast, have concluded that a principled original-
ist cannot follow nonoriginalist precedent.24  Consider Gary Lawson’s pro-
vocative argument that departures from the original public meaning can
never be justified.25  Grounding his argument in Marbury v. Madison’s justifi-
cation for judicial review, Lawson claims that because the Constitution is
hierarchically superior to all other sources of law, a statute in conflict with
the Constitution is void.26  The same principle applies, he says, to judicial
opinions.  Judicial opinions, like statutes, are hierarchically inferior to the
Constitution itself, and if they conflict with the Constitution, they are, prop-
erly understood, no law at all.27  “If a statute,” Lawson argues, “enacted with
all of the majestic formalities for lawmaking prescribed by the Constitution,
and stamped with the imprimatur of representative democracy, cannot legiti-
23 See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent,
103 NW. U. L. REV. 803, 836–38 (2009) (arguing that an originalist should follow
nonoriginalist precedent rather than overrule it when, inter alia, the costs of overruling
would be borderline catastrophic—as they would be with respect to paper money—or
when the principles would be supported by constitutional amendment in the absence of
the cases—as they would be with respect to race and gender discrimination); see also
MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 10, at 154–74 (arguing that Article III incorporates a
minimal notion of precedent and empowers judges to develop it further; because the Con-
stitution itself authorizes precedent, it authorizes judges to adhere to the precedent in
preference to the original meaning; the question for the judge is simply how to measure
the tradeoff so that he knows when to follow precedent and when to follow the original
public meaning).
24 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, No, It’s Super Precedent: A Response to
Farber and Gerhardt, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1232, 1233 (2006) (insisting that while “faint-hearted
originalists” are willing to make a pragmatic exception to stare decisis to avoid political
suicide, “[o]ther originalists like Mike Paulsen, Gary Lawson, and myself—call us ‘fearless
originalists,’ . . .—reject the doctrine of stare decisis in the following sense: if a prior deci-
sion of the Supreme Court is in conflict with the original meaning of the text of the Consti-
tution, it is the Constitution and not precedent that binds present and future Justices.”
(footnotes omitted)); see also Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning:
Not as Radical as It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 258–59 (2005) (arguing that original-
ism is inconsistent with precedent because “[o]riginalism amounts to the claim that the
meaning of the Constitution should remain the same until it is properly changed,” and the
Constitution authorizes change only by constitutional amendment).
25 See Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
23 (1994).  Lawson was the first to argue that enforcing precedent in conflict with the
Constitution is unconstitutional. See id. at 28 n.16 (noting that “[p]rior critics of precedent
have stopped short of actually declaring the practice unconstitutional,” and that “I know of
no judge who expressly renounced the use of precedent on constitutional grounds” (cita-
tions omitted)).
26 See id. at 26; see also id. at 27 (maintaining that Marbury’s rationale for judicial review
means that “legislative or executive interpretations of the Constitution are no substitute for
the Constitution itself.  The court’s job is to figure out the true meaning of the Constitu-
tion, not the meaning ascribed to the Constitution by the legislative or executive depart-
ments.” (footnote omitted)).
27 See id. at 26–27.
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mately be given effect in an adjudication when it conflicts with the Constitu-
tion, how can a mere judicial decision possibly have a greater legal status?”28
Thus, he claims, “If the Constitution says X and a prior judicial decision says
Y, a court has not merely the power, but the obligation, to prefer the
Constitution.”29
Justice Scalia took neither tack: he neither articulated a theory attempt-
ing to reconcile adherence to nonoriginalist precedent with originalism nor
argued that the original public meaning must always control.  Instead, he
treated stare decisis as a “pragmatic exception to [his originalist theory].”30
In his well-known essay, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, he described his position
this way:
I can be much more brief in describing what seems to me the second
most serious objection to originalism: In its undiluted form, at least, it is
medicine that seems too strong to swallow.  Thus, almost every originalist
would adulterate it with the doctrine of stare decisis—so that Marbury v.
Madison would stand even if Professor Raoul Berger should demonstrate
unassailably that it got the meaning of the Constitution wrong.31
This is consistent with the views he expressed at his confirmation hearing.
Pressed by Senator Edward Kennedy to describe his position on stare decisis,
Justice Scalia responded that “[t]o some extent, Government even at the
Supreme Court level is a practical exercise.  There are some things that are
done, and when they are done, they are done and you move on.”32  While he
allowed that there were some mistakes he would be willing to correct,33 he
characterized others as “so woven in the fabric of law” that he would not
touch them.34
Justice Scalia’s pragmatism earned him criticism from both allies and
intellectual opponents.  Some of the former expressed regret that Justice
28 Id. at 27; see also id. at 28 (“[T]he case for judicial review of legislative or executive
action is precisely coterminous with the case for judicial review of prior judicial action.
What’s sauce for the legislative or executive goose is also sauce for the judicial gander.”).
29 See id. at 27–28.  Justice Scalia, by contrast, accepted stare decisis, while admitting
that its “whole function . . . is to make us say that what is false under proper analysis must
nonetheless be held to be true, all in the interest of stability.” SCALIA, supra note 2, at 139.
30 SCALIA, supra note 2, at 140 (emphasis omitted).
31 Scalia, supra note 1, at 861.
32 13 ROY M. MERSKY & J. MYRON JACOBSTEIN, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 1916–1986, at 132 (1989).
33 He stated, “I will not say that I will never overrule prior Supreme Court precedent.”
Id. at 131.  He characterized some precedents as weaker and others stronger under the
doctrine of stare decisis, see id., and said that the weight a precedent carries “depends on
the nature of the precedent, the nature of the issue,” id.
34 Id. at 132.  He did not specify, however, where any actual Supreme Court precedent
fell. Id. (“Now, which of those you think are so woven in the fabric of the law that mistakes
made are too late to correct, and which are not, that is a difficult question to answer.  It can
only be answered in the context of a particular case, and I do not think that I should
answer anything in the context of a particular case.”).
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Scalia was willing to make any sacrifice of principle,35 and the latter seized
upon his willingness to compromise as evidence that originalism is itself
unprincipled.36  In the remainder of this Essay, I will consider whether Jus-
tice Scalia’s approach to stare decisis was as unprincipled as these criticisms
suggest.
II. ORIGINALISM IN PRACTICE
The thrust of the stare decisis-based critique of originalism is that “if
[originalists] were to vote their principles, their preferred approach would
produce instability, chaos, and havoc in constitutional law.”37  This threat is
vastly overstated, because no originalist Justice will have to choose between
his principles and the kind of chaos critics predict.  Justice Scalia was never
forced to make any of the decisions that critics cast as deal-breakers for
originalism.  He was never required, for example, to decide whether paper
money is constitutional or whether Brown v. Board of Education was rightly
decided.  The validity of these cases—and, for that matter, most of the cases
printed in the United States Reports—is never challenged because the rules
of adjudication keep the question of their validity off the table.
As I have explained elsewhere, “other features of the federal judicial sys-
tem, working together, do more than the constraint of horizontal stare deci-
sis to keep the Court’s case law stable.”38  A combination of rules—some
constitutional, some statutory, and some judicially adopted—keep most chal-
lenges to precedent off the Court’s agenda.  The Justices not only lack any
35 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of ‘Faint-Hearted’ Originalism, 75
U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 13 (2006) (arguing that Justice Scalia is “unfaithful to the original mean-
ing of the text” because, inter alia, “he is willing to avoid objectionable outcomes that
would result from originalism by invoking [nonoriginalist] precedents”); Nelson Lund,
Antonin Scalia and the Dilemma of Constitutional Originalism 14 (George Mason Univ. Legal
Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. LS16-36, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2880578 (arguing that Justice Thomas’s approach to stare decisis,
not Justice Scalia’s, is “what one would expect from a committed originalist,” because Jus-
tice Thomas, unlike Justice Scalia, is willing to “repudiate[ ]” constitutional doctrine incon-
sistent with the Constitution).
36 Laurence Tribe’s critique of Justice Scalia’s position is representative: “That Justice
Scalia, despite his protestations, implicitly accepts some notion of evolving constitutional
principles is apparent from his application of the doctrine of stare decisis.”  Laurence H.
Tribe, Comment, in SCALIA, supra note 2, at 65, 82.  Justice Scalia resented the suggestion
that originalists were uniquely unprincipled, because, as he put it, stare decisis is a “com-
promise of all philosophies of interpretation.” SCALIA, supra note 2, at 139.
The demand that originalists alone “be true to their lights” and forswear stare
decisis is essentially a demand that they alone render their methodology so disrup-
tive of the established state of things that it will be useful only as an academic
exercise and not as a workable prescription for judicial governance.
Id.
37 MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 192 (2008).
38 Amy Coney Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1711,
1730 (2013).  For a fuller discussion of the relationship between originalism, stare decisis,
and agenda control, see id. at 1730–37; see also Barrett & Nagle, supra note 7.
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obligation to work systematically through the United States Reports looking
for errors; the “case or controversy” requirement prevents them from doing
so.  Not only are they limited to answering questions presented by litigants
seeking resolution of a live dispute, the Court’s discretionary jurisdiction gen-
erally permits it to choose which questions it wants to answer.  This in and of
itself keeps the most potentially disruptive challenges to precedent off the
Court’s docket.  Even if a petitioner asked the Court to revisit, say, its 1937
conclusion that the Social Security Act is constitutional, there is no chance
that the Court would grant certiorari.39
To be sure, erroneous precedents may lie in the background of cases
that the Court has agreed to decide.  Assume that a Justice has doubts about
whether Marbury v. Madison was wrongly decided.  The Justice will implicitly
rely upon Marbury in every exercise of judicial review.  But the Justice,
whatever her theoretical doubts, has no obligation to open an inquiry into
whether Marbury (and, for that matter, every other decision lying in the back-
ground of the case before her) is right.  Indeed, the rule that the Court will
decide only those questions presented in the petition for certiorari constrains
Justices from deciding the merits of every legal issue that lurks in a case.40
That rule is not hard and fast, and the Justices sometimes raise additional
issues, like the matter of precedent’s validity, on their own.41  But doing so
happens when a Justice wants to address the merits of precedent.  If a prece-
dent is so deeply embedded that its overruling would cause chaos, no Justice
will want to subject the precedent to scrutiny.
Taken together, these features of the judicial system function like a hid-
den avoidance mechanism: they keep the question whether precedent
should be overruled off the table altogether.42  The doctrine of stare decisis
is often credited with keeping precedent stable, but the force of that doctrine
only kicks in when the question whether to overrule precedent is called.  The
39 See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (holding that the Social Security Act is
constitutional).
40 See SUP. CT. R. 14.1(a) (“Only the questions set out in the petition, or fairly included
therein, will be considered by the Court.”).
41 See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792, 797 (2009) (overruling Michigan v.
Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), after calling for supplemental briefing on the question
whether it should be overruled); Payne v. Tennessee, 498 U.S. 1076 (1991) (ordering sup-
plemental briefing on the question whether two controlling precedents should be over-
ruled).  This practice has been sharply criticized. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 396 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that ordering the
parties to address whether precedent should be overruled is “unusual and inadvisable for a
court” (footnote omitted)).  The Court has also occasionally reconsidered precedent with-
out even asking the parties to argue the point, a practice that is also criticized. See, e.g.,
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 673–74 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court
for having “reached out” to decide whether to overrule precedent when the issue was
neither raised nor briefed by the parties).
42 Cf. GERHARDT, supra note 37, at 45 (“The justices’ respect for the Court’s precedents
is evident in their choices of which matters not to hear.  Thus, in the certiorari process, the
justices often demonstrate their desire to adhere to or accept precedents they might not
have decided the same way in the first place.”).
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overwhelming majority of Supreme Court cases remain stable because the
Court never faces the question.  Stability, therefore, is less attributable to the
doctrine of stare decisis than to the fact that the Constitution does not
require the Court to identify, much less rectify, every constitutional mistake.
Justices focus their attention on the contested question in front of them and
are permitted to operate on the assumption that surrounding but unchal-
lenged law is correct.  The system could not operate otherwise; it would grind
to a halt if the Justices were obliged to identify and address every single legal
issue contained within a case.
Justice Scalia operated within this system.  Stephen Sachs jokes that
originalists are often viewed as “followers, allegedly, of a nefarious ‘Constitu-
tion in Exile,’ waiting in their subterranean lairs to subdue the populace and
abolish the New Deal.”43  But Justice Scalia had no desire to exhume all
errors from the United States Reports.  On the contrary, he observed:
Originalism, like any theory of interpretation put into practice in an ongo-
ing system of law, must accommodate the doctrine of stare decisis; it cannot
remake the world anew.  It is of no more consequence at this point whether
the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 were in accord with the original under-
standing of the First Amendment than it is whether Marbury v. Madison was
decided correctly. . . . [O]riginalism will make a difference . . . not in the
rolling back of accepted old principles of constitutional law but in the rejec-
tion of usurpatious new ones.44
And that, indeed, is the field on which Justice Scalia played.  He faced some
conflicts between the Constitution’s original meaning and contrary prece-
dent, but his commitment to originalism did not put him at continual risk of
upending settled law.  Originalism does not obligate a justice to reconsider
nonoriginalist precedent sua sponte, and if reversal would cause harm, a Jus-
tice would be foolhardy to go looking for trouble.  Justice Scalia didn’t.  As
he once quipped, “I am a textualist.  I am an originalist.  I am not a nut.”45
The precedents that Justice Scalia voted to overrule were not in the cate-
gory that constitutional scholars sometimes call “super precedent”—cases so
deeply embedded that their overruling is off the table.46  For example, Jus-
tice Scalia rejected precedent asserting the power to give newly decided civil
cases only prospective application on the ground that this is not a feature of
the “judicial Power”47 as it was understood at the Founding,48 and he argued
43 Stephen E. Sachs, The “Constitution in Exile” as a Problem for Legal Theory, 89 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2253, 2254 (2014).
44 SCALIA, supra note 2, at 138–39.
45 COYLE, supra note 1, at 163 (quoting Justice Antonin Scalia) (emphasis omitted).
46 See Gerhardt, supra note 18, at 1207–17 (identifying several “constitutional decisions
whose correctness is no longer a viable issue for courts to decide,” including Marbury v.
Madison, Mapp v. Ohio, the Legal Tender Cases, Brown v. Board of Education, and the Civil
Rights Cases); see also Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINN. L.
REV. 1173, 1180–82 (2006) (identifying the constitutionality of social security, paper
money, school segregation, independent agencies, federal economic regulation, and the
incorporation of the Bill of Rights as “bedrock precedents” that “cannot be undone”).
47 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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that Miranda v. Arizona should be discarded for its lack of support in “history,
precedent, or common sense.”49  He was persistent in his view that “the
Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits successive prosecution, not successive pun-
ishment,”50 and he refused to join opinions using the Lemon test to enforce
the Establishment Clause.51  He repeatedly argued that the Court should
overrule its cases holding that a woman has a substantive due process right to
terminate her pregnancy,52 and he consistently declined to apply the cases
48 See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 200–05
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (similar).  He also maintained, despite con-
trary precedent, that the separation-of-powers principle prohibits Congress from assigning
cases to an Article I court on the theory that they involve “public rights” if the federal
government is not a party to the suit. See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 503 (2011)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“I adhere to my view . . . that—our contrary precedents notwith-
standing—‘a matter of public rights . . . must at a minimum arise between the government
and others.’” (second alteration in original) (citations omitted)); Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 68–69 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (arguing that the traditional “public rights” exception was grounded in the
original understanding of the concepts of sovereign immunity and “the judicial power,”
but the modern, pragmatic balancing test extending that exception was unmoored from
both text and history (emphasis omitted)).
49 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 450, 461–65 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
50 Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 407 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dep’t of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth
Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 804–05 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting)); see also id. at 406 (“This is one
of those areas in which I believe our jurisprudence is not only wrong but unworkable as
well, and so persist in my refusal to give that jurisprudence stare decisis effect.”).
51 Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 399–400
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I will decline to apply Lemon—whether it
validates or invalidates the government action in question—and therefore cannot join the
opinion of the Court today.”).
52 He repeatedly urged the overruling of Roe v. Wade. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (urging an explicit overruling of
Roe).  Once Casey superseded Roe, he urged its overruling as well. See Stenberg v. Carhart,
530 U.S. 914, 955 (2000) (insisting that “Casey must be overruled”).  While some have
characterized Roe v. Wade as a “superprecedent[ ],” see Arlen Specter, Op-Ed., Bringing the
Hearings to Order, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/24/opin-
ion/24specter.html, scholars do not put Roe on the super precedent list because the public
controversy about Roe has never abated. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Prece-
dent Viewed Through the Lens of Hartian Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107, 1116
(2008) (“[A] decision as fiercely and enduringly contested as Roe v. Wade has acquired no
immunity from serious judicial reconsideration, even if arguments for overruling it ought
not succeed.”); Gerhardt, supra note 18, at 1220 (asserting that Roe cannot be considered a
super precedent in part because calls for its demise by national political leaders have never
retreated).
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holding that the Due Process Clause imposes a “fairness” cap on punitive
damages.53
He was willing to overrule precedent outright in the above cases because
he thought that the error was clear and that traditional stare decisis factors
like reliance or workability counseled it.  There were other cases, however, in
which he thought that precedent was wrong but did not advocate outright
overruling.  The following four areas illustrate Justice Scalia’s pragmatism in
handling conflicts between his commitment to the original public meaning
and the pull of settled precedent: (1) the dormant Commerce Clause; (2)
substantive due process; (3) the Eighth Amendment; and (4) Congress’s
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. Dormant Commerce Clause
Justice Scalia attacked the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence in his very first term.  In Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State
Department of Revenue, he concluded a lengthy explanation of his disagree-
ment with those cases with the assertion that
the Court for over a century has engaged in an enterprise that it has been
unable to justify by textual support or even coherent nontextual theory, that
it was almost certainly not intended to undertake, and that it has not under-
taken very well.  It is astonishing that we should be expanding our beach-
head in this impoverished territory, rather than being satisfied with what we
have already acquired by a sort of intellectual adverse possession.54
Tyler Pipe, however, did not require him to decide whether he would vote
to overrule the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine; he could decide the
case by refusing to extend it.  When he faced the former question in his sec-
ond term, Justice Scalia articulated the following approach: he would adhere
to the line of cases invalidating state laws that discriminated against interstate
commerce despite his belief that those cases were wrong,55 but he refused to
apply the line of cases that required the Court to balance the state law’s bur-
den on interstate commerce against its benefit unless the challenged law was
53 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he punitive damages jurisprudence which has sprung forth from BMW v.
Gore is insusceptible of principled application; accordingly, I do not feel justified in giving
the case stare decisis effect.”); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“When, however, a constitutional doctrine adopted by the Court is
not only mistaken but also insusceptible of principled application, I do not feel bound to
give it stare decisis effect—indeed, I do not feel justified in doing so.”).
54 483 U.S. 232, 265 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  In American Trucking Ass’ns v.
Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987), a case handed down the very same day, Justice Scalia
asserted, “For the reasons given in my dissent in [Tyler Pipe], I do not believe that test can
be derived from the Constitution or is compelled by our past decisions.” Id. at 304 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
55 See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 898 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“In my view, a state statute is invalid under the
Commerce Clause if, and only if, it accords discriminatory treatment to interstate com-
merce in a respect not required to achieve a lawful state purpose.”).
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indistinguishable from a law previously held unconstitutional by the Court.56
In that event, he “would normally suppress [his] earlier view of the matter
and acquiesce in the Court’s opinion that it is unconstitutional.”57  He thus
drew a line between “decisional theory,” which he felt free to reject, and
application of that theory to particular facts, which he felt constrained to
follow.58  He remained constant in this approach to dormant Commerce
Clause cases throughout his entire tenure on the Court.59
It is worth paying attention to the careful distinction that Justice Scalia
drew between “decisional theory” and results.  In some circumstances, he felt
obligated to adhere to nonoriginalist decisional theory.  He adhered to the “dis-
crimination” test in dormant Commerce Clause doctrine because it estab-
lished a clear line that was relatively easy for courts to apply.  By contrast, he
thought the “balancing” test was unpredictable and that it therefore did not
offend reliance or stability interests to abandon it.60  His judgment about
56 Id. at 897 (“I would therefore abandon the ‘balancing’ approach to these negative
Commerce Clause cases, first explicitly adopted 18 years ago in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
and leave essentially legislative judgments to the Congress.” (citation omitted)); see also id.
(“Issues already decided I would leave untouched.”).
57 Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 204 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).  He refused to do so, however, if the law at issue predated the Court’s decision
holding unconstitutional a similar law and would have been consistent with the Court’s
then-existing jurisprudence. Id. at 204–05.  In that event, protecting settled expectations
cut the opposite way. See id.
58 See id. at 204 (“Although I will not apply ‘negative’ Commerce Clause decisional
theories to new matters coming before us, stare decisis—that is to say, a respect for the
needs of stability in our legal system—would normally cause me to adhere to a decision of
this Court already rendered as to the unconstitutionality of a particular type of state law.”).
Crawford v. Washington also illustrates this commitment to the preservation of results, albeit
from a different angle.  541 U.S. 36 (2004).  There, Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for the
Court rejecting the decisional theory of Ohio v. Roberts in favor of what he believed to be
the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 60.  The Justice was at pains to
emphasize, however, that the new theory left the past results, if not their methodology,
intact. Id. (“Although the results of our decisions have generally been faithful to the origi-
nal meaning of the Confrontation Clause, the same cannot be said of our rationales.”).
59 See, e.g., Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1809–10
(2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (reiterating the illegitimacy of the Court’s negative Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence and identifying the two circumstances in which he would
nonetheless adhere to it); Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 359 (2008)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part) (same); United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid
Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 348 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (same); Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 312 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (same); Healy v.
Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 344 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (joining the Court’s opinion insofar as it held a Connecticut statute facially
discriminatory).
60 In Bendix Autolite, 486 U.S. at 897–98, he asserted that abandoning the “balancing”
prong of negative Commerce Clause analysis does not upset reliance interests because “the
outcome of any particular still-undecided issue under the current methodology is in my
view not predictable . . . no expectations can possibly be upset.”  At the same time,
“[b]ecause the outcome of the [discrimination] test I would apply is considerably more
clear, confident expectations will more readily be able to be entertained.” Id. at 898.
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when to challenge and when to acquiesce in decisional theory thus reflected
a traditional application of stare decisis.61
Even when he rejected a nonoriginalist decisional theory, however, he
considered whether to treat the nonoriginalist results reached under that the-
ory differently.  Because reliance interests in the Court’s view about specific
laws (as opposed to the Court’s view about more general doctrines) are par-
ticularly high, he stuck with those results even in the “balancing” cases whose
decisional theory he rejected.  He felt particularly strongly about the reliance
interests at stake in that situation.  While he did not think that specific dispo-
sitions were set in stone, he thought that the Court should “retain [its] abil-
ity . . . sometimes to adopt new principles for the resolution of new issues
without abandoning clear holdings of the past that those principles
contradict.”62
B. Substantive Due Process
Justice Scalia had “misgivings about Substantive Due Process as an origi-
nal matter.”63  Nonetheless, he acquiesced in the Court’s incorporation of
certain guarantees in the Bill of Rights “because it is both long established
and narrowly limited.”64  He refused, however, to accept the body of prece-
dent standing for the “proposition that the Due Process Clause guarantees
certain (unspecified) liberties, rather than merely guarantees certain proce-
dures as a prerequisite to deprivation of liberty.”65  Despite this belief, he did
occasionally acquiesce in the line of due process opinions maintaining that
the liberty interest in the Due Process Clause protected those rights deemed
fundamental by history and tradition.66  He thus did not entirely distance
61 See Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 78–79 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (describing his approach to negative
Commerce Clause cases as “serv[ing] the principal purposes of stare decisis, which are to
protect reliance interests and to foster stability in the law”).
62 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 320–21 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
63 McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
64 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
275 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
65 Albright, 510 U.S. at 275 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res.
Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 470–71 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that while he was
willing to accept incorporation, he was unwilling to accept that the Due Process Clause “is
the secret repository of all sorts of other, unenumerated, substantive rights”); SCALIA, supra
note 2, at 24 (“[I]t may or may not be a good thing to guarantee additional liberties, but
the Due Process Clause quite obviously does not bear that interpretation.  By its ines-
capable terms, it guarantees only process.”).
66 In Michael H. v. Gerald D., Justice Scalia wrote for the Court that “[i]n an attempt to
limit and guide interpretation of the Clause, we have insisted not merely that the interest
denominated as a ‘liberty’ be ‘fundamental’ (a concept that, in isolation, is hard to objec-
tify), but also that it be an interest traditionally protected by our society.”  491 U.S. 110, 122
(1989) (footnote omitted).  He joined the Court’s opinion in Washington v. Glucksberg,
which described substantive due process analysis as recognizing “those fundamental rights
and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’”
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himself from a decisional theory he thought unsupported by the Constitu-
tion.  At the same time, he found that history and tradition were reason to
refuse rather than to recognize the existence of the urged right; the result in
these cases, if not the analysis, was the same as it would have been under his
preferred approach.67
Like the dormant Commerce Clause cases, the substantive due process
cases draw a line between “decisional theory” and “results.”  In Troxel v. Gran-
ville, Justice Scalia dissented from the Court’s holding that a Washington stat-
ute permitting the children’s paternal grandparents to gain court-ordered
visitation against the mother’s wishes violated the Due Process Clause.  He
conceded that older opinions of the Court had recognized a substantive due
process right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children, but he
characterized their “claim to stare decisis protection” as “small” given that
their application did not yield predictable results.68  Consistent with his
approach in dormant Commerce Clause cases, he did not propose disturbing
the results of the two cases on which the Court relied (especially because that
had not been urged), but he did propose abandoning the theory of decision
upon which they rested by refusing to apply it in new contexts.69
C. Eighth Amendment
Justice Scalia thought that the Court’s Eighth Amendment cases were
flawed in at least two respects.  First, he thought that the Court should look
and requiring that the right at stake be carefully described.  521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997)
(quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).  He joined Chief Justice
Robert’s dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges acknowledging the validity of substantive due process
so long as the rights it found implied were rooted in history and tradition.  135 S. Ct. 2584,
2618 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567
(1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is my position that the term ‘fundamental rights’ should
be limited to ‘interest[s] traditionally protected by our society.’” (alteration in original)
(quoting Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122)).
67 See also Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 161 (2011)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (insisting that the Due Process Clause had no
substantive component but that even under the history-and-tradition formula applied to
identify these “faux” rights, respondent’s claim to a right to informational privacy would
fail).  As he once put it in an extrajudicial context, “[t]he vast majority of my dissents from
nonoriginalist thinking . . . will, I am sure, be able to be framed in the terms that, even if
the provision in question has an evolutionary content, there is inadequate indication that
any evolution in social attitudes has occurred.” Scalia, supra note 1, at 864 (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted).
68 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 92 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The sheer diver-
sity of today’s opinions persuades me that the theory of unenumerated parental rights
underlying [Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232–33 (1972); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)] has small claim to
stare decisis protection.  A legal principle that can be thought to produce such diverse out-
comes in the relatively simple case before us here is not a legal principle that has induced
substantial reliance.”).
69 See id. (“While I would not now overrule those earlier cases (that has not been
urged), neither would I extend the theory upon which they rested to this new context.”).
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to the original application of the Eighth Amendment, not evolving standards
of decency, to determine whether a punishment was “cruel and unusual.”70
Second, he rejected the proposition that the Eighth Amendment requires
that a punishment be proportionate to the offense.71  He applied the former
decision theory, but not the latter, on grounds of stare decisis.72  He justified
the latter departure on the ground that the precedent was not only inconsis-
tent with the Eighth Amendment, but one he could not “intelligently
apply.”73
His concession to “evolving standards of decency” might be taken as
some evidence of faint-hearted originalism because, as in the substantive due
process context, he acceded to a decisional theory that he thought at odds
with the original public meaning of the Constitution’s text.  As in the case of
substantive due process, however, the results in the cases were the same as
those he would have reached under his preferred reasoning.74
Two other death penalty cases are revealing of Justice Scalia’s approach
to potential conflicts between original meaning and erroneous precedent.
He expressed doubts about Furman v. Georgia’s holding that it was “cruel and
unusual” to give the sentencer unfettered discretion to decide whether to
impose the death penalty because it rendered the penalty a “random and
infrequent event.”75  But because Furman did not clearly contradict the text,
he was willing to adhere to it on grounds of stare decisis.  Indeed, because of
stare decisis, he explicitly refrained from even undertaking to examine
70 In Stanford v. Kentucky, Justice Scalia described the “evolving standards” test as “cast
loose from the historical moorings consisting of the original application of the Eighth
Amendment.”  492 U.S. 361, 378–79 (1989) (opinion of Scalia, J.), abrogated by Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  He nonetheless applied it on behalf of a plurality of Jus-
tices to conclude that the execution of minors does not violate the Eighth or Fourteenth
Amendments. Id. at 369–73 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion).
71 He thought that the text squarely foreclosed the proportionality requirement
because, while it forbids “excessive” bail, it says nothing about “excessive” punishment.
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 670 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).  On the contrary, the only express limitation on punishment is that it
not be “cruel and unusual.” Id.; see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 351 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the proportionality rule “has no
place in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence” and that “[t]he punishment is either
‘cruel and unusual’ (i.e., society has set its face against it) or it is not” (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting Stanford, 492 U.S. at 378 (internal quotation marks omitted)), abrogated by
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)).
72 See supra note 60.
73 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (asserting that he would not apply the proportionality requirement on grounds of
stare decisis because the requirement was not one he could “intelligently apply”).
74 See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 368 (noting that the execution of minors was permitted
when the Bill of Rights was adopted); see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 608–15 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (describing the “evolving standards” test as in accordance with our modern (though I
think mistaken) jurisprudence and demonstrating why that test did not justify the major-
ity’s conclusion); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 341–48 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (similar).
75 Walton, 497 U.S. at 670 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
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whether Furman’s interpretation was consistent with the historical meaning
of “unusual punishment.”76
He was not willing, however, to follow a line of cases holding that the
mandatory imposition of death (i.e., a scheme that gives the sentencer no
discretion) was cruel and unusual punishment.77  In contrast to Furman,
which rested on the ground that the randomness and infrequency of capital
punishment in discretionary capital sentencing rendered that punishment
“cruel and unusual,” Justice Scalia thought that mandatory capital sentencing
“cannot possibly violate the Eighth Amendment, because it will not be ‘cruel’
(neither absolutely nor for the particular crime) and it will not be ‘unusual’
(neither in the sense of being a type of penalty that is not traditional nor in
the sense of being rarely or ‘freakishly’ imposed).”78  He refused to follow
these cases on grounds of stare decisis not only because they had “no proper
basis in the Constitution,” but also because he found them in irreconcilable
tension with Furman.79  He announced, moreover, that he had no intention
of acquiescing in those cases in the future: “I will not, in this case or in the
future, vote to uphold an Eighth Amendment claim that the sentencer’s dis-
cretion has been unlawfully restricted.”80
D. Section 5
Despite “misgiving[s],” Justice Scalia joined City of Boerne v. Flores,81
which announced that Congress’s exercise of its power under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment must be “congruen[t] and proportional[ ]” to
the constitutional violation it was designed to remedy.82  By the time Tennes-
see v. Lane arrived at the Court, the Justice had reconsidered his view.  He
concluded that the limit on Congress’s power was set by the language of Sec-
tion 5: Congress had the power “to enforce” the Fourteenth Amendment but
not to enact prophylactic measures going beyond what the Constitution itself
requires.83  Yet as he acknowledged, “The major impediment to the
approach I have suggested is stare decisis.”84  Major statutes like the Voting
76 Id. at 671.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 672–73.
80 Id. at 673.
81 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
82 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 556 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing City
of Boerne and listing its progeny, which he had joined).
83 Id. at 560 (“[W]hat § 5 does not authorize is so-called ‘prophylactic’ measures,
prohibiting primary conduct that is itself not forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment.”
(emphasis omitted)).
84 Id.; see also id. (“Literally, ‘to enforce’ means to compel performance of the obliga-
tions imposed; but the linguistic argument lost much of its force once the South Carolina
and Morgan cases decided that the power to enforce embraces any measure appropriate to
effectuating the performance of the state’s constitutional duty.” (quoting Archibald Cox,
Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91,
110–11 (1966) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
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Rights Act assumed the validity of the Court’s earliest Section 5 cases, which
held that Section 5 conferred prophylactic power on Congress.85  The long-
standing cases endorsing prophylactic power were almost exclusively in the
area of racial discrimination, which was the principal concern of the Four-
teenth Amendment.  He decided, therefore, to preserve both the results and
the decisional theory of the Section 5 cases in the context of racial discrimi-
nation.  “[P]rincipally for reasons of stare decisis, I shall henceforth apply the
permissive McCulloch standard to congressional measures designed to remedy
racial discrimination by the States.”86  Outside the context of race, he would
not accept assertions of prophylactic power, and if the legislation truly
“enforced” the amendment, he would give it full effect without considering
whether it was congruent and proportional.87
III. PRAGMATISM AND PRINCIPLE
Justice Scalia’s opinions in the cases are consistent with the approach he
described in extrajudicial writing: he was willing to treat stare decisis as a
limited, pragmatic exception to originalism.  The careful explanations he
gave, however, open up potential lines of inquiry for those exploring whether
the tension between originalism and stare decisis can be resolved as a matter
of principle.
First, it is worth paying attention to Justice Scalia’s distinction between
decisional theory and results.  Discussions of stare decisis tend not to differ-
entiate between the two.  Adhering to a nonoriginalist decisional theory
poses a different and more theoretically difficult issue for the originalist than
does simply leaving the result of a decision in place. Perpetuating a deci-
sional theory might function as a “virtual amendment” of the Constitution’s
text, substituting a new legal standard for the one originally imposed by the
text.  For example, Laurence Tribe levies this charge: “That Justice Scalia,
despite his protestations, implicitly accepts some notion of evolving constitu-
tional principles is apparent from his application of the doctrine of stare deci-
sis.”88  But there is a difference between leaving the result of precedent in
place (for instance, the holding that certain state laws violate the dormant
Commerce Clause) and accepting its decisional theory as governing new con-
texts (as he would have done had he applied the dormant Commerce Clause
“balancing test” to new state laws).89  Originalist scholars have raised the pos-
85 Id.
86 Id. at 564.
87 Id. at 565.
88 Tribe, supra note 36, at 82 (footnote omitted).
89 See supra notes 54–62 and accompanying text.  He also drew a distinction between
results and decisional theory in the context of substantive due process. See supra notes
68–69 and accompanying text.  And Mitchell v. United States provides yet another example.
526 U.S. 314 (1999).  There, he expressed doubt about the soundness of precedent hold-
ing that prosecutorial or judicial comment on the defendant’s refusal to testify violates the
Fifth Amendment. Id. at 332 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Because he thought that this rule may
well have “become ‘an essential feature of our legal tradition,’” he did not propose overrul-
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sibility that a principle of equity might be able to justify giving stare decisis
effect to nonoriginalist decisions.90  If that theory were developed, it might
be better suited to holding results, rather than decisional theories, in place.
Second, Justice Scalia’s “no harm, no foul” approach to the decisional
theories of “evolving standards of decency” in the Eighth Amendment and
substantive due process contexts prompts reflection on what fidelity to the
Constitution requires.  In both contexts, he accepted nonoriginalist deci-
sional theories that led to the same result as the originalist approach he pre-
ferred.91  Is a Justice unfaithful to the Constitution because he joins a poorly
reasoned opinion that gets to the right place?  Put differently, is fidelity to
the Constitution measured by the Court’s judgment or its opinion, by its
result or by its reasoning?92
Third, stability is fostered by what we might call an “avoidance canon”
for stare decisis—avoiding the reexamination of precedent by assuming argu-
endo that it is correct.  This technique of assuming, and therefore not investi-
gating, a precedent’s validity to avoid the possibility of overruling it is a
critical means of keeping law stable.  As Part II explained, every judicial deci-
sion makes this implicit assumption with respect to a large swath of the law
that surrounds the issue contested in court.  Sometimes, however, an opinion
makes that assumption explicit with respect to specific “neighboring” prece-
dent.  Such a move does not endorse the correctness of the prior decision;
rather, it avoids inquiry into the decision’s merits.  Thus, for example, Justice
Scalia did not “reconsider” the view that the Fourteenth Amendment incor-
porated the Bill of Rights against the states, when “straightforward applica-
ing it. Id.  He did, however, refuse “to extend these cases into areas where they do not yet
apply, since neither logic nor history can be marshaled in defense of them.” Id.
90 See Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 817, 858–64 (2015) (raising the possibility that stare decisis is a “domesticating doc-
trine” permitting courts to treat mistaken precedents “as if” they are the law).
91 Justice Scalia took a similar tack in Hudson v. United States.  522 U.S. 93 (1997).  The
Justice believed that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited successive prosecution, not
multiple punishment, and he had dissented to the Court’s prior cases holding otherwise.
Id. at 106 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).  In Hudson, the Court backtracked from
its position, although not as completely as Justice Scalia would have liked; it continued to
maintain that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited multiple punishments, but it
required successive criminal prosecutions as well. Id.  Even though this was not the deci-
sional theory that Justice Scalia thought correct, he concurred because the presence of the
requirement for successive prosecutions “essentially duplicates what I believe to be the
correct double jeopardy law, and will be . . . harmless in the future.” Id.
92 Cf. Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 123, 126–27 (1999) (“As valuable as opinions may be to legitimize judgments, to give
guidance to judges in the future, or to discipline a judge’s thinking, they are not necessary
to the judicial function of deciding cases and controversies.  It is the judgment, not the
opinion, that ‘settle[s] authoritatively what is to be done.’” (alteration in original) (foot-
note omitted) (quoting Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1371 (1997))).
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tion of settled doctrine suffice[d] to decide it.”93  Despite doubts, he did not
“explore the subject” whether Furman v. Georgia’s interpretation of “cruel
and unusual” was consistent with the Eighth Amendment’s historical mean-
ing because the text could bear its meaning.  And in several cases, he
declined to decide whether precedent should be overruled when the parties
did not urge overruling.94  To be sure, explicitly stating that one is refraining
from considering whether precedent is right signals that one thinks the pre-
cedent is probably wrong.  That may be an invitation to parties to argue that
point in the future, or a Justice may feel compelled to acknowledge obvious
tension between relevant precedent and his otherwise stated views.  Whatever
the motivation, it preserves the precedent without having to address either its
merits or the stare decisis question.  Justice Scalia once said that the “whole
function of [stare decisis] is to make us say that what is false under proper
analysis must nonetheless be held to be true, all in the interest of stability.”95
The avoidance technique for stare decisis says “I am not deciding whether
this is false or, if it is, whether stare decisis would compel me to say that it is
true.”
The practice of assuming—without deciding—that all surrounding,
unchallenged law is correct operates invisibly.  It is thus hardly noticed, and
the way in which it contributes to the law’s stability is underappreciated.  The
attention comes when the presumption is set aside.  For example, the Court
sometimes calls for supplemental briefing to address the issue whether a pre-
cedent that the parties did not challenge should be overruled.96  Or, Justices
93 See McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(asserting that the case did not require him to “reconsider” the view that the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights against the States, because “straightforward
application of settled doctrine suffices to decide it”).
94 See also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 92 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“While I
would not now overrule those earlier cases (that has not been urged), neither would I
extend the theory upon which they rested to this new context.”).  In 44 Liquormart v. Rhode
Island, he expressed “discomfort” with Central Hudson, a case counseling “special care” in
the review of blanket bans on commercial speech that were not deceptive or otherwise
flawed.  517 U.S. 484, 517 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring).  At the same time, the parties did
not raise or brief the question whether the precedent should be overruled, and Justice
Scalia did not want to reach the question with inadequate information:
Since I do not believe we have before us the wherewithal to declare Central
Hudson wrong—or at least the wherewithal to say what ought to replace it—I must
resolve this case in accord with our existing jurisprudence, which all except Jus-
tice Thomas agree would prohibit the challenged regulation.  I am not disposed
to develop new law, or reinforce old, on this issue, and accordingly I merely con-
cur in the judgment of the Court.
Id. at 518.
95 SCALIA, supra note 2, at 139; see supra note 28.
96 For example, in Montejo v. Louisiana, Justice Scalia was part of the majority who
sought supplemental briefing on the question whether a precedent key to resolving that
case should be overruled.  556 U.S. 778, 792 (2009) (“Accordingly, we called for supple-
mental briefing addressed to the question whether Michigan v. Jackson should be over-
ruled.”).  The Court ultimately overruled Michigan v. Jackson. Id. at 797.
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sometimes urge the overruling of a case where the merits of the precedent
were neither raised nor briefed by the parties.97  The Court also decides how
much precedent to unsettle when it decides how broadly to write an opinion:
there are sometimes disputes about whether the Court should overrule a pre-
cedent outright or merely narrow it and leave the question whether it should
be overruled for another day (or never).98  These choices are not best under-
stood as choices about the strength of stare decisis.  They are better under-
stood as choices about whether to put the merits of precedent on the agenda,
thereby forcing the Court to consider whether stare decisis should hold the
precedent in place.
Students of stare decisis focus primarily on how stare decisis should play
out once the validity of a precedent is on the table, but agenda control is
equally if not more important.  It also poses a distinct set of questions.  For
example, it is worth considering whether principle ever obligates a justice to
put the question of precedent’s validity on the table sua sponte; whether duty
strongly counsels a minimalist approach that avoids questioning precedent
wherever possible; whether it is a matter left to the prudential judgment of
each Justice; and, if it is a prudential judgment, what factors should guide the
decision.
CONCLUSION
Justice Scalia admitted that “in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted
originalist.”99  Stare decisis, however, rarely put him in a crunch, mostly
because of the underappreciated features of our system that keep the law
stable without need for resort to the doctrine of stare decisis.  To the extent
he was occasionally faint hearted, however, who could blame him for being
human?  As the Justice himself put it:
As for the fact that originalism is strong medicine, and that one cannot real-
istically expect judges (probably myself included) to apply it without a trace
97 For example, in Randall v. Sorrell, Justices Thomas and Scalia urged the overruling
of Buckley v. Valeo even though the respondents asked only as an “afterthought” and did
not brief the stare decisis issue. See 548 U.S. 230, 263–64 (2006) (Alito, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (insisting that it was “unnecessary” to reach the issue
whether Buckley v. Valeo should be overruled when respondents asked only as an “after-
thought” and did not brief the stare decisis issue); id. at 264 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(similar); cf. id. at 265–73 (Thomas, J., concurring).
98 See Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (holding that
an Establishment Clause challenge to the executive expenditure of funds did not fall
within Flast v. Cohen’s narrow exception to the prohibition on “taxpayer standing”).  Justice
Scalia concurred only in the judgment, because he would have overruled Flast altogether
rather than distinguish it as the majority did. See id. at 636 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“Overruling prior precedents, even precedents as disreputable as Flast, is nev-
ertheless a serious undertaking, and I understand the impulse to take a minimalist
approach.”); see also id. at 633 (“Minimalism is an admirable judicial trait, but not when it
comes at the cost of meaningless and disingenuous distinctions that hold the sure promise
of engendering further meaningless and disingenuous distinctions in the future.”).
99 See Scalia, supra note 1, at 864; supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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of constitutional perfectionism: I suppose I must respond that this is a world
in which nothing is flawless, and fall back upon G.K. Chesterton’s observa-
tion that a thing worth doing is worth doing badly.100
Nothing is flawless, but I, for one, find it impossible to say that Justice Scalia
did his job badly.
100 Scalia, supra note 1, at 863.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-5\NDL502.txt unknown Seq: 24  5-JUL-17 15:26
1944 notre dame law review [vol. 92:5
